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abstract 
This article aims to map the locations of identity prejudice that occurs in the context of a 
Community of Inquiry. My claim is that epistemic injustice, which usually originates from 
seemingly ‘minor’ cases of identity prejudice, can potentially leak into the actual practice of 
P4wC. Drawing from Fricker, the various forms of epistemic injustice are made explicit when 
epistemic practices are framed within concrete social circumstances where power, privilege 
and authority intersect, which is observable in school settings. In connection, despite the 
pedagogical improvements P4wC offers, some forms of identity prejudice prevalent in 
traditional classrooms may persist, affecting children who are identified with negatively 
stereotyped social groups. It is, therefore, important to pay attention to the reality of 
epistemic injustice and the possible locations where it may potentially surface in the COI. 
Drawing from my P4wC experience, I show that identity prejudice stems from the 
intersections of the roles and positionalities of the participants in a philosophical dialogue. 
These intersections point towards the epistemic relationships of the P4wC teacher, the 
students, and the P4wC program itself. I conclude that identity prejudice arises 
circumstantially and/or substantively in P4wC scholarship and practice.  
 
keywords: epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutic injustice, identity prejudice, 
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mapeando preconceito de identidade: 
locais da injustiça epistêmica na filosofia para/com crianças 
 
resumo 
Este artigo tem como objetivo mapear os locais de preconceito de identidade que podem se 
manifestar no contexto de uma Comunidade de Investigação. O argumento aqui é que a 
injustiça epistêmica, que geralmente começa com casos aparentemente "menores" de 
preconceito de identidade, poderia potencialmente vazar para a prática real do FcpC. 
Partindo de Fricker, as várias formas de injustiça epistêmica são explicitadas quando as 
práticas epistêmicas são enquadradas em circunstâncias sociais concretas em que poder, 
privilégio e autoridade se cruzam, o que é observável nos ambientes escolares. Em conexão, 
apesar das melhorias pedagógicas oferecidas pela FcpC, algumas formas de preconceito de 
identidade prevalecentes nas salas de aula tradicionais podem persistir, afetando crianças 
identificadas com grupos sociais estereotipados negativamente. Portanto, é importante 
prestar atenção à realidade da injustiça epistêmica e aos possíveis locais onde ela pode surgir 
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potencialmente na COI. Com base na minha experiência na FcpC, mostro que o preconceito 
de identidade decorre das interseções dos papéis e posicionamentos dos participantes de um 
diálogo filosófico. Essas interseções apontam para as relações epistêmicas do professor de 
FcpC, dos alunos e do próprio programa de FcpC. Concluo que o preconceito de identidade 
surge circunstancial e/ou substancialmente na bolsa de estudos e na prática da FcpC. 
 
palavras-chave: injustiça epistêmica; testemunho e injustiça hermenêutica; preconceito; 
comunidade de investigação; filosofia para/com crianças 
 
mapeo de prejuicios de identidad: 
ubicaciones de injusticia epistémica en filosofía para/con niños 
 
resumen 
Este artículo tiene como objetivo mapear prejuicios de identidad que pueden manifestarse en 
el contexto de una Comunidad de Investigación. La argumentación aquí es que la injusticia 
epistémica, que generalmente comienza con casos aparentemente "menores" de prejuicio de 
identidad, podría filtrarse en la práctica real de P4wC. Partiendo de Fricker, las variadas 
formas de injusticia epistémica se hacen explícitas cuando las prácticas epistémicas se 
enmarcan dentro de las circunstancias sociales concretas donde se cruzan el poder, el 
privilegio y la autoridad, lo cual es más observable en entornos escolares. En relación con 
esto, a pesar de las mejoras pedagógicas que ofrece P4wC, algunas formas de prejuicio de 
identidad que prevalecen en las aulas tradicionales pueden persistir y afectar particularmente 
a los niños y niñas que se identifican con grupos sociales estereotipados negativamente. Por 
lo tanto, es crucial prestar atención a la realidad de la injusticia epistémica y los posibles 
lugares donde podría surgir potencialmente en la COI. A partir de mi experiencia en P4wC, 
muestro que el prejuicio de identidad puede provenir de las intersecciones de roles y 
posiciones de los participantes en un diálogo filosófico. Estas intersecciones pertenecen a las 
relaciones epistémicas entre el maestro en P4wC, los alumnos y la propia P4wC. Concluyo 
que el prejuicio de identidad surge circunstancial y/o sustancial en los estudios y en la 
práctica de P4wC. 
 
palabras clave: injusticia epistémica; injusticia testimonial y hermenéutica; perconcepto; 
comunidad de investigación; filosofía para / con niños 
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mapping identity prejudice: 
locations of epistemic injustice in philosophy for/with children 
 
introduction 
Prejudice is an unjustified adverse attitude towards a particular social group 
(COHRS & DUCKITT, 2012; GOLU, 2013). It is often fueled by widespread negative 
stereotypes that are overgeneralized to the members of that group without a 
reasonable basis or even a direct experience with them. In schools, prejudice can 
potentially impede students’ academic, social, and psychological well-being (STEELE, 
1997; BENNER, CROSNOE & ECCLES, 2014). Over time, prejudice causes systemic 
discrimination, thereby making it difficult for students identified with negatively 
stereotyped groups to pursue their educational potentials.  
Recent discourses on Social Epistemology tackle the phenomenon of epistemic 
injustice in which a person is wronged on the basis of his/her capacity as a knower 
(FRICKER, 2007; MEDINA, 2017). Children, taken as a social domain, become 
subjects of epistemic injustice due to a prejudice against their young age and lack of 
experience (MURRIS, 2013; SCHÜES 2016; BURROUGHS & TOLLEFSEN, 2016). This 
happens when what they have to say is systematically and unreasonably 
dismissed because they are children. Accordingly, their questions, views, and 
experiences are given low epistemic credibility, causing adults to discredit their 
capacity as sources of knowledge (BAUMTROG, 2018).  
Despite the notable improvements P4wC offers in addressing the deficits of 
traditional models of education, is it possible that epistemic injustice would still occur 
in a Community of Inquiry? This is the central question this article hopes to address. 
The assumption here is that transforming a class into a COI does not happen 
immediately. Some old habits and practices prevalent in a traditional classroom 
would continue to persist despite the appropriation of the principles and procedures 
of inquiry and collaborative dialogue. Hence, depending on the circumstances, a COI 
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has to address the issue of identity prejudice by constantly paying attention to the 
possible locations where epistemic prejudice potentially occurs. 
This article is divided into three parts. The first part consists of a literature 
review on epistemic injustice within P4wC. It includes a short discussion on the 
nature, types and effects of epistemic injustice. The second part tackles how children 
become subjects of epistemic injustice, which is followed by a discussion of the 
dimensions of epistemic injustice within the school setting. The third part is a 
narration of five observations from my experience where some forms of identity 
prejudice surfaced. From these observations, I conclude that identity prejudice, which 
can lead to epistemic injustice, arise circumstantially, and/or substantively in P4wC 
theory and practice.  
 
epistemic injustice in p4wc: a brief literature review 
It is not farfetched to suppose that the pervasiveness of prejudice and negative 
stereotypes, particularly in schools, had made an impact on Matthew Lipman and the 
early proponents of the program. In Thinking in Education, he stresses that “critical 
thinking is hostile to all stereotyping; and since such stereotyping is the mechanism 
through which biased thinking operates, to all prejudice” (LIPMAN, 2003, p.220). For 
him, prejudice is a product of a mental mistake or a lack of sophisticated cognitive 
skills to resist or counter its various forms. Education, for this reason, should aim to 
impart to students the skills for better judgment since teaching them how to think 
well addresses this cognitive lack. Critical and reflective thinking ought to be 
exercised and developed as it prepares children to recognize bias, prejudice and self-
deception, as well as to protect them from being subjected to it (Ibid., p.26, p.273). He 
also recognizes that in cases of prejudice, “it is difficult to correct the matter simply 
by direct communication or instruction” (Ibid., p.184). This implies that teaching 
children about prejudice didactically may not necessarily lead to positive changes in 
behavior. On this note, Guin (1992) observes that it is “unlikely that admonitions and 
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exhortations will have much effect, especially with children already schooled in 
intolerance” (p.141). What is needed is a pedagogy that immerses children in an 
intellectually challenging yet nurturing environment where rational procedures and 
democratic values are not only talked about but, most importantly, applied and 
practiced. The Community of Inquiry is one such pedagogy that fosters the 
habituation of virtuous mental attitudes, which students can internalize in the long 
run. 
Several P4wC practitioners call for an increased awareness of the problem of 
prejudice and epistemic injustice. Drawing from the ideas of Fricker, Karin Murris 
(2013) argues that “credibility deficit is related to age in that being of a particular age 
has a significant impact on how much credibility a hearer affords a speaker, and 
when and how s/he is silenced systematically” (p.249). While Fricker’s analyses of 
the phenomenon of epistemic injustice are applied mainly to issues related to gender 
and race, Murris draws attention to the prejudice committed to children - also known 
as ageism - which can weigh on a child’s psychological and emotional well-being, 
potentially impeding her intellectual and emotional growth. This implies that 
repeated experience of identity prejudice harms the educational development of a 
child and her capacity to make sense of her own experiences independently. In this 
regard, she challenges those involved in the education of the young to develop the 
virtue of epistemic justice, which involves “resisting and normalizing discourses 
about child and hearing child’s unique voice” (Ibid. p.257).  
Arie Kizel (2016) also addresses the problem of structural epistemic injustice, 
which for him creates situations where children are unable to express their identity 
and narratives. He observes that even in the context of a philosophical dialogue, there 
are children who feel constrained to express their thoughts and feelings because their 
respective narrative “does not accord with that of the dominant national narrative” 
(p. 17). This follows that despite the presuppositions of objectivity and neutrality, a 
community of philosophical inquiry may still be governed by dominant and 
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exclusivist meta-narratives. This is a crucial insight since it shows that a COI can 
never be neutral. Kizel, however, asserts that communities of philosophical inquiry 
can provide a discursive space in which participants can freely and actively express 
their otherness. He calls this theoretical model “enabling identity,” which is aimed to 
address the pervasiveness of meta-narratives of the mainstream society, thereby 
allowing spaces where marginalized voices are heard, and unique identities 
expressed (p. 20).  
Moving forward, Jana Mohr Lone (2018) explains the effect of not listening 
seriously to children on our shared hermeneutical resources. While maintaining that 
epistemic injustice can have a detrimental impact on the epistemic abilities of 
children, she also thinks that “the credibility deficit experienced by children results in 
a lack of access by adults to important sources of knowledge and new perspectives” 
(LONE, 2018). In other words, the epistemic harms directed particularly at children 
also affect adults in that undermining their unique narratives results in an 
impoverished understanding of the world. Children’s positionality as ‘newcomers’ 
could provide us with valuable insights from their unique perspectives, which is no 
longer accessible to an adult. She adds that children’s perspectives can help us to 
“think about philosophical questions - about justice, ethics, friendship, etc. - in new 
and fresh ways” (Ibid.).  
Moreover, Reed-Sandoval and Sykes (2017) argue for an increased sensitivity 
towards the impact of positionality in the context of a COI as it affects how a child 
discovers meaning from her experiences of the world. Similar to Kizel’s observation, 
some children are “positioned such that their lived experiences and philosophical 
questions are socially under-valued and unrecognized” (REED-SANDOVAL & 
SYKES, 2017, p.220). Despite the democratic values fostered in a COI, it is not easy for 
these children to make themselves heard in a dialogue. Thus, even if P4wC is already 
an improvement from the traditional models of education, it may still “underserve, 
and perhaps even marginalize, children who suffer epistemic injustice” (Ibid.). For 
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this reason, they recommend taking positionality seriously in P4wC research and 
practice in order to avoid being uncritical and complicit towards the epistemic 
authority of the status quo, which tend to dominate in a dialogue. 
Meanwhile, there are other notable works that also tackle, albeit indirectly, 
occasions of epistemic injustice in the context of P4wC research and practice. 
Rainville (2001) makes a critical observation concerning indigenous students who 
have been exposed to prolonged institutional marginalization. He argues that “even 
when we set democratic goals within the classroom, children are still subject to the 
subtle influences and pressures which shape and constrain all of [their] lives” (p.69). 
He is wary that the supposedly neutral approach of P4wC pedagogy may reinforce 
the marginalization of children coming from indigenous communities who 
participate in a COI. This is echoed by Madrid (2008), who reports a crucial insight 
regarding the transcultural applicability of the dialogical procedures and key 
concepts in P4wC based on her experience with native Oaxacan children. She 
poignantly notes that  
Sometimes we think that we are behaving in a democratic manner, 
but from another point of view, we are arrogant, disrespectful and 
ignorant, and we end up in unwitting complicity with the forces of 
oppression and inequality. Are we naïve, and do we have the right to 
be naive in communities with a history of oppression? We need to 
realize and remain aware of the political implications of the discourse 
model we are offering, otherwise we will be like religious 
missionaries—changing forms of life under a profoundly mistaken 
assumption (p.134). 
This literature review, though not exhaustive, shows that tackling the various 
forms of prejudice in the context of P4wC is a critical aspect of its scholarship and 
practice. Most of these works imply that P4wC is not a ‘magic wand’ that can 
dramatically dissolve all the problems related to the education of children. It certainly 
has its limitations, both theoretically and practically. Nevertheless, it stands as a 
better alternative especially in addressing the problem of epistemic injustice, not least 
because it is built on the fundamental recognition that children are thinkers, a claim 
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that carries an imperative for adults to listen and show epistemic trust to what 
children have to say.  
 
 
epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutic 
Epistemic injustice is a type of harm done by an individual towards another 
person, which unfairly and unreasonably prevent her from actively exercising her 
intellectual abilities, potentially impeding her self-development. In her 2007 book, 
Miranda Fricker explains that an epistemic injustice occurs when someone is 
wronged based on her capacity as a knower (FRICKER, 2007, p.1). This is predicated 
on the assumption that every human individual possesses an inherent ability to make 
sense of her experiences of the world, and the capability to convey knowledge to 
others. Central to it is the recognition of every person’s right to know and 
communicate information without being subjected to prejudice or bias.  
The discourse on epistemic injustice foregrounds the inherent sociality of 
human epistemic practices. It departs from the classical epistemological approaches 
that presuppose an abstracted understanding of the subject of knowledge, 
independent of the social conditions surrounding it. This means that situating the 
knower, the known, and the process of knowing within its social context makes 
possible the articulation of the complex intersections of power, privilege, and 
authority operating within various social institutions and groups. It follows that 
taking the basic epistemological elements as interdependent and inextricably linked 
to the context, especially to the positionalities of the persons involved, exposes the 
ethical features of these epistemic interactions.  
Testimonial Injustice is a subcategory of epistemic injustice, which occurs when 
a “prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” 
(Ibid., p. 1). This is the most common form of epistemic injustice in which the hearer’s 
prejudice unfairly accords a speaker less credibility as a giver of knowledge based on 
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some aspects of her identity, such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, and socio-economic 
status. This happens when one does not trust what the other person says as much as 
one should due to some assumed prejudice towards the speaker’s identity. Fricker 
characterizes this as “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit” (Ibid., p.4). It must be 
noted that a testimonial injustice is not merely an “innocent error” as it “involves not 
only a kind of intellectual carelessness, but also harmful and immoral attitudes” 
(SHERMAN AND GOGUEN, 2019, p.3). This is why epistemic injustice is ethically 
and epistemically wrong.  On the other hand, hermeneutic injustice is another 
subcategory in which the epistemic harm arises due to an absence of conceptual and 
linguistic resources resulting in a disproportionate treatment of some individuals or 
groups. Fricker explains that this stems from “a gap in collective hermeneutical 
resources—a gap, that is, in our shared tools of social interpretation—where it is no 
accident that the cognitive disadvantage created by this gap impinges unequally on 
different social groups” (FRICKER, 2007, p.6). In other words, the knower’s social 
situation causes and even sustains an absence of collective meanings, thereby 
depriving her of making sense of and articulating an objectively unjust experience. At 
the core of hermeneutic injustice is the fact that some individuals and groups are 
rendered voiceless in the collective process of meaning-making (MEDINA, 2017). 
This is imminent in societies where members of various minority groups are denied 
the “opportunity to articulate their experiences, be heard by others, and reach new 
collective understandings” (SHERMAN & GOGUEN, 2019, p.6).  
A society without prejudice and negative stereotypes is obviously a utopian 
aspiration. In an imperfect society with imperfect individuals, prejudice is simply 
unavoidable. However, there are forms of prejudice that cause a broad and enduring 
impact on certain people. These are unreasonable and unfounded prejudgments that 
affect not only one aspect of a person’s identity, but also in the other dimensions of 
her social life. Thus, when a negative stereotype affects not only epistemically, but 
also educationally, sexually, religiously and politically, the said prejudice is no longer 
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a mere ‘simple’ and isolated case of discrimination, but a case of epistemic injustice. It 
is, therefore, essential to pay attention to epistemic injustice as it can damage a 
person’s pursuit for healthy development of self. Just as social inequality results in 
the exclusion of some social groups from opportunities to develop their potentials 
and live good lives, epistemic injustice, likewise, causes some social groups to be 
deprived of freely exercising their epistemic abilities and actualizing their epistemic 
potentials sans fear, prejudice, and intimidation. Among these social groups that are 
susceptible to epistemic injustice are children. I will explore this in the next section.  
 
children as subjects of epistemic injustice  
Children become subjects of epistemic injustice when adults dismiss what they 
have to say (even if it is true) because they are children. In these situations, the lack of 
epistemic trust accorded to a child stems from a prejudice based on age, which 
inevitably places them at a disadvantaged position in the knowledge community. In 
other cases, these prejudices are compounded when the other aspects of a child’s 
identity (e.g., ethnicity, language, religion, and gender) are also used as bases for the 
dismissal of her testimony. Schües argues that the “well-being of children is a mirror 
of the state of justice in the world” (2016, p.156). That children should be listened to 
without prejudice is linked to the claim that their lives and the unjust structures 
surrounding them manifest the kind of society they live in. What this implies is that 
the epistemic injustice children endure is not apparent insofar as the prejudice 
towards them is deeply rooted, and in many ways hidden, within the normative 
social structures and institutions. Ironically, among the social institutions where 
children experience identity prejudice are schools, which supposedly function as 
centers for the development of humane values, such as equality, freedom, and justice. 
 
epistemic injustice in the school setting  
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To sketch the various ways in which students (and also teachers) are subjected 
to identity prejudice, I follow Kotzee (2017) in determining the possible dimensions 
where epistemic injustice may arise. These dimensions pertain to the epistemic 
relationships of the teacher, students, the curricula, and the school in general.  
The first dimension points to the level of credibility assigned to learners. This 
manifests when school authorities assign an unreasonably low epistemic credit to 
students owing to a prejudice or a negative stereotype attached to their social 
identity. For instance, epistemic harm is done to a student when teachers 
unreasonably discredit the veracity of her testimony because she is just a ‘child’ or 
simply a ‘student.’ The second dimension pertains to the implicit criteria teachers use 
in crediting particular learners. This occurs when teachers inflate their credibility 
judgment towards the views of students who are perceived to belong in the dominant 
and privileged groups. Such inflated judgment may be based on a particular 
student’s physical features, economic status, intelligence, language, and social 
influence in the classroom. The third dimension touches on what the teachers teach in 
the class. The content and method of a prescribed curricula can be a site for epistemic 
injustice, especially when the process of creating them systematically renders 
invisible and inaccessible the salient knowledge about the less privileged social 
groups. The fourth dimension refers to the criteria of admitting students to particular 
courses of study. When an individual is denied admission in a course or a 
school because of her background, say, sexual orientation or religion, she is wronged 
as a knower who possesses the basic right to education. The fifth dimension points to 
the process of choosing who gets accepted as teachers and scholars. This occurs when 
a school avoids fostering diversity in its teaching and non-teaching ranks by 
systematically denying access to prospective teachers and scholars from marginalized 
groups. The sixth dimension pertains to the ways students give epistemic credit to 
teachers. Here, epistemic injustice arises when students treat certain teachers with 
less credibility and authority due to their social background. This happens mostly to 
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teachers who are positioned in a less privileged status in the society, such as those 
who are graduates of an unfamiliar university, members of minority groups (e.g., 
LGBTQ+), and those who do not share the dominant religion. Lastly, the seventh 
dimension refers to the criteria students use to credit (or discredit) the epistemic 
abilities of other students. This manifests, for instance, when some students assign an 
unreasonably deflated epistemic status to their fellow classmates owing to a 
widespread negative stereotype associated with them.  
These dimensions provide us with a ‘map’ where we can locate possible 
occasions of identity prejudice in the COI to catch potential cases of epistemic 
injustice. In the school setting, spotting identity prejudice is rather tricky as it does 
not always appear as blatant as when it happens outside the school. Some prejudice 
appear ‘normal,’ such as, when a well-meaning teacher religiously follows a 
curriculum without noticing its underlying bias against other forms and sources of 
knowledge, or when a school rejects applications from particular students not 
because they failed the entrance exam but because of their other backgrounds, such as 
religion or sexual orientation. School authorities, therefore, ought to have an acute 
awareness of how identity prejudice may leak into their school ethos and policies. 
 
locations of identity prejudice in p4wc 
In this section, I outline five locations/intersections where identity prejudice 
manifested in my P4wC experiences. I have to note that these observations do not 
necessarily constitute epistemic injustice. They are, however, instances of identity 
prejudice, which either lead or, in other cases, reinforce an already existing testimonial 
and hermeneutic injustice. The salient point here is that these forms of identity 
prejudice cause serious epistemic harms when unchecked or tolerated over a period 
of time.  
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identity prejudice occurs when a p4wc teacher unwittingly assigns a low credibility judgment 
of children’s ideas 
This first observation involves myself as a neophyte P4wC teacher who 
unwittingly assigned a low credibility judgment to the ideas shared by two 5th-grade 
indigenous students. In one of our dialogues, the question the class chose to tackle 
was: ‘What are the characteristics of a good leader?’ The dialogical inquiry led to a 
sharing of wonderful ideas. However, one student dared to share a slightly ‘off’ 
answer. For him, a leader “should carry guns and kill those who do not obey.” His 
answer caused mixed reactions from the group, and it encouraged another boy to 
add: “a leader should be an authoritarian!” Mindful that these non-standard answers 
could stimulate the inquiry further, I encouraged them to discuss their answers, 
which eventually ended with a consensus that rejected their propositions. Quietly in 
my mind, however, I did not give their answers due credence and, in fact, mentally 
categorized them as childish responses. Such answers must have been influenced by 
watching too many action movies, I thought. Though I did not dismiss their answers 
during the inquiry, I gave them a deflated view because these boys seemed innocent 
and were merely expressing some trivial ideas. Put differently, they simply did not 
know what they were talking about. Later that day, I met one of the boys’ mother and 
mentioned to her what her son said in the class. She confided to me that, for some 
time, her son studied in a ‘school’ situated in a very remote part of their town that is 
believed to be an area where some members of the New People’s Army2 were based. 
According to what her son told her, it was common for him to see adult men carrying 
guns while talking to their teachers and elders in the community. These scenarios 
must have instilled in the young boy’s mind the image of a leader who asserts 
authority using the might of a gun. Upon hearing this, it became clear to me that my 
prior idea of him as an ‘innocent boy with childish ideas’ was a stereotype I 
unwittingly assigned to him because of his age and appearance.  
 
2 The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed group of the Communist Party of the Philippines.  
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While my naiveté did not necessarily constitute an epistemic injustice, it was 
nevertheless an occasion of identity prejudice leading me to treat his idea with low 
epistemic credit. In other words, I heard him but failed to seriously listen to his point 
owing to my unchecked implicit assumptions. I could only imagine how often 
testimonies like these from young students are not given proper attention even 
among the most well-meaning teachers. What if a student is trying to communicate 
an ongoing abuse, but her manner of expression makes it seem unbelievable? Or 
what if a student attempts to share an unsettling experience, but the context where it 
is told makes it sound less serious? The point here is that epistemic injustice stems 
from seemingly ‘trivial’ and ‘inconspicuous’ cases of identity prejudice in which 
teachers downplay the importance, or in other cases the urgency, of a child’s 
testimony. When these moments are tolerated and prolonged, they would inevitably 
compound, which in the long run, potentially damage a student’s perception not only 
towards her epistemic abilities but her overall sense of self. 
 
identity prejudice is probably taking place in a class when some children feel deterred to 
engage in the inquiry  
This second observation shows that even within the context of a COI, children 
feel deterred to engage in the dialogue because they are impaired either positionally 
or intellectually. If we look at the COI from the vantage of power and privilege, we 
see a hierarchy of epistemic relations between those who have more epistemic power 
or influence, and those who have less. Because of such hierarchy, some students are 
constrained to participate because they think they have less epistemic power in 
relation to the other students in the COI. In other words, these children are hesitant 
to participate because they are impaired positionally. In these cases, prejudice is 
already operating in the class and, to some extent, already internalized. Santoro and 
Kumar (2014) point out that in some cases, children “internalize their condition of 
deprivation, thus failing to interpret it as a case of injustice” (p.2). This is true 
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especially among students who have experienced repeated cases of identity 
prejudice. Despite being fully aware that their experience is objectively wrong, their 
environment normalizes the prejudice, thereby forcing them to accept it as part of 
their everyday lives. Even when there are no explicit expressions of negative 
stereotypes within the COI, some of these children cannot see beyond their perceived 
inferior positionalities, consequently deterring them from contributing to the 
dialogue.   
Meanwhile, there are cases when a student is unable to participate in a 
sustained rational dialogue because she is impaired intellectually. In the school where 
I taught P4wC, there is a 12-year old female student who is well-known in the 
campus for being stuck in third grade. One time, she joined our P4wC class, showed 
interest in the dialogue, but never said a word. Curious about her, I asked her teacher 
and the principal who explained to me that she has a ‘unique’ condition. For me, this 
meant only one thing: she has special educational needs. As I found out later on, 
there are actually two of them who have a learning disability. The other is an 18-year 
old boy in fourth grade who also has an undiagnosed special need. In a P4wC class, 
these students may not necessarily feel deterred to engage in the dialogue despite 
their condition; however, the chances of them being subjected to social stereotypes 
(especially since they are mixed with the other students) can cause further damage to 
their growth and development.3 
Being impaired positionally or intellectually can discourage some children 
from engaging actively in philosophical dialogues. For this reason, it is essential to be 
sensitive towards how prejudice already operate in the class even before they are 
exposed to P4wC. Ignoring these identity prejudices could reinforce hermeneutic 
injustice that cripples their ability to make sense of their own experiences. When 
 
3 Unfortunately, in the Philippines, the Department of Education has much to improve in its program 
for children who have special educational needs. Most low-income families cannot send their children 
to schools that can specifically address their condition. This is why children from poor families are sent 
to regular schools, consequently increasing the chances of them being subjected to repeated prejudice 
based on their condition.  
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students start to think that it is ‘normal’ to experience bullying and discrimination 
regularly, it only shows that there is a considerable gap in their hermeneutical 
resources, thereby disabling them to see and confront these epistemic harms 
objectively.  
 
identity prejudice occurs when children assign low epistemic credit to what their less 
privileged classmates have to say 
Epistemic injustice may also happen between children. Usually, this occurs 
when a child rejects her classmate’s view based on her social background, e.g., 
gender, economic status, or academic standing in the class. This fourth observation 
describes how children assigned a deflated credibility judgment towards their less 
privileged classmates, not because their ideas were irrelevant or wrong, but because 
deeply established negative stereotypes influenced their views of them.  
On one occasion, to facilitate an ethical thinking exercise, I appropriated a 
thought experiment4 in which they have to choose a limited number of people who 
can safely stay for a year inside a safe house while the earth supposedly recovers 
from a huge catastrophe. Their votes will decide who will be saved according to the 
social roles they deem important in the future. Each student got a random piece of 
paper (which I prepared) that assigned them a particular social identity. Before the 
voting started, they had to describe and explain to the class their imagined identities 
to convince their classmates of the importance of their supposed role in society. 
Interestingly, the identities who were chosen to be saved were: an older man, a 
president, a librarian, a mother, an engineer, a driver, and a criminal. This activity 
was a helpful exercise that encouraged them to decide independently and provide 
reasons for their decisions. However, what was more interesting for me was the fact 
that some of them downplayed what their other classmates said, not according to the 
reasons they provided, but based on the manner of describing their supposed identity. 
 
4 This activity is patterned from the movie “After the Dark” (2013) which can be viewed as a 
simulation of Rawls’ idea of the ‘veil of ignorance’ and ‘natural lottery’. 
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Their tone, language, choice of words, and even their gestures were given more 
weight than the reasons offered. Consequently, those children whose manner of 
expression was deemed ‘acceptable’ were more favored than those who were not able 
to express themselves well. Moreover, some of them were ‘judged’ based on their 
position in the class, as in the case of the student who picked the identity of a 
‘criminal’ but was positively selected by the majority because he was popular. In 
other words, most of them voted according to who their classmate actually is to them, 
rather than on each other’s imagined identity in the thought experiment. As a result, 
those who are not well-favored in the class received fewer votes even if they had 
picked an objectively important social identity.  
Meanwhile, I observed that some well-meaning students also felt constrained 
to reasonably participate in the activity due to the widespread prejudice attributed to 
their less privileged classmates. These students who are conscious of the effects of the 
negative stereotypes assigned to their vulnerable classmates also felt hampered to 
address the ongoing prejudice because they were only few and outnumbered. For a 
child, it seemed convenient to just get along with the majority than to stand against 
them. Beeby (2019) articulates a similar problem when she asks: “What do we do 
when more or less well-intentioned knowers, who do their knowing under the 
influence of unjust or otherwise epistemically corrosive social structures and 
institutional frameworks, end up perpetuating such structures?” (p.233). Applied to 
my context, her question has two implications: a) not all students tolerate the 
negative stereotypes assigned to their less privileged classmates and, b) there are 
deeply-rooted negative stereotypes which, even for a reflexive and well-intentioned 
student, are too difficult to address.  
 
children taking p4wc classes may be prejudiced owing to a collective interpretation of 
philosophy as a ‘dangerous’ subject 
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In this fourth observation, the potential epistemic harm occurs in societies 
where the term ‘Philosophy’ is assigned a pejorative meaning or is socially 
understood as a ‘dangerous’ subject. In the context of my P4wC practice, the identity 
prejudice is caused by people who maintain a negative bias towards Philosophy in 
general and, by extension, towards those who study it.  
During my first P4wC class, the well-meaning principal curiously asked: what 
do you teach in a Philosophy class? In my previous experiences, when this question is 
asked by someone who has a little background of the subject, it sometimes implies 
that the person’s intent is not to know my answer any more than to express his 
presumptions about the term ‘philosopher.’ Before I could give a quick reply to his 
question, it did not take long for him to mention the pejorative interpretation of 
‘pilosopo’ (philosopher) and its local trope ‘Pilosopong Tasyo’ from Jose Rizal’s 
novel, which equates a philosopher to a fool.5 His follow-up question was as loaded 
as the first: Are you teaching children to become philosophers? In this English translation, 
a non-Filipino may not see any problem with such a seemingly neutral question. 
However, in its original articulation in my dialect, the question actually carries a host 
of assumptions, mostly disapproving. In the Philippines, ‘pilosopo’ could mean many 
things to different Filipinos. This term calls to mind an image of a sophist who is 
good at rhetorical argumentation without any concern for the truth. It could refer to a 
person who disrespectfully talks back at someone in authority, such as a parent. It 
could also represent someone who uses humor (often nonsensical) to get out of a 
confrontation or to trump a dialogue. Among my well-meaning friends, for instance, 
some could not contain their worry that exposing young children to philosophical 
questions and topics at an early age might be inappropriate, and to some extent, 
dangerous. Their notion of philosophical thinking is understandably predicated on a 
crude perception of philosophical thinking that is devoid of respect and ethical 
responsibility. These interpretations of ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’ infuse a 
 
5 From the novel Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not) written by Dr. Jose Rizal, Philippine’s national hero. 
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legitimate worry among Filipino adults who think that children might be encouraged 
to challenge societal beliefs and family traditions disrespectfully and uncaringly.  
By and large, young Filipinos do not have yet preconceived biases towards 
Philosophy in general. However, Filipino adults surrounding them, viz., parents, 
teachers, and those who assume disapproving interpretations of the term ‘pilosopo’ 
may exert undue prejudice to those who will participate in P4wC classes. Likewise, it 
causes a considerable gap in the hermeneutic understanding of Philosophy in 
general, thereby blocking Filipino children out from discovering its valuable role in 
shaping the collective consciousness of a society.  
 
hermeneutic injustice follows when the ‘p’ in p4wc excludes other modes of understanding 
and of doing philosophy 
This fifth observation refers to my observation concerning the theoretical 
foundations of P4wC. I notice that little attention has been given to the integration of 
indigenous epistemologies and other non-western philosophies in the conceptual and 
methodological landscape of P4wC. One reason for this lack of attention, I think, is 
the fact that when Philosophy is appropriated in non-western cultural arenas, it 
usually comes with a western epistemic ‘baggage’ that naturally clashes with and 
usually dominates over the underlying epistemology of the locale. Accordingly, in 
assuming the applicability of P4wC theory and practice in different cultural settings, 
one inevitably assents to the presupposition that the ‘Philosophy’ in P4wC is 
generalizable in various contexts. It follows that its methodology, likewise, has a 
generalizable feature which can transcend space and time. Taken in this sense, 
Philosophy assumes a hegemonic character that leaves unchallenged the idea that 
philosophical thinking can be exercised regardless of the situated-ness of knowers and 
their rootedness on culture, language, beliefs, and traditions. Philosophy is obviously 
integral in P4wC, but before one deploys it in actual practice, there are at least three 
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questions that need to be asked: Whose Philosophy? What kind of Philosophy? And 
for whom?  
My claim here is that ‘Philosophy’ is universal insofar as it pertains to the 
fundamental human ability to make sense of the world and to search for the truth. 
However, ‘Philosophy’ is not universal if it is narrowly reduced to the ideas and 
methodologies put forward by western philosophers. It is important to mention here 
that P4wC has already been appropriated and practiced in the different parts of the 
world, including several non-western countries. I do not mean to imply that it is 
confined within western theories and methods. Nevertheless, as a P4wC 
practitioner/researcher who is from a non-western society, I cannot help but rely on 
western literature to support my practice due to the dearth of materials and resources 
in my local context. This does not necessarily translate to a ‘bad practice’ since a 
comprehensive theoretical grasp and practical exposure to the various expressions of 
P4wC are integral in a robust research. The point here is that it is incumbent upon a 
non-western practitioner like myself to diversify my resources and cultivate 
alternative views that apply to my context. Concretely, this means choosing locally-
produced literature that is relevant and interesting to children. In my case, I broaden 
my P4wC repertoire with various eastern literature6, which also stimulate critical, 
caring, and creative thinking.  
Moreover, such diversification is not only limited to merely adding other 
sources of literature to be utilized in the dialogues. Rather, it also entails exploring 
other ways of carrying out a philosophical reflection. This means expanding the 
modes and criteria for philosophizing to include other equally legitimate 
epistemologies. Indigenous knowledge, for instance, is an abundant reservoir that can 
expand the theoretical foundations of the program. For instance, a presentational 
epistemology, which is an undercurrent in most indigenous forms of knowledge, 
provides a counterweight to the representational epistemology dominant in most 
 
6 I integrated selected stories from local indigenous communities, and some passages from Chinese 
and Buddhist Philosophies.  
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P4wC practice. In this approach, the child discovers that epistemic agency does not 
solely proceed from her or tied to her but shared with her and the community. This 
‘indigenized’ philosophical inquiry challenges the assumption that the world can 
only be discovered and conquered discursively and intellectually (ELICOR, 2019). 
In relation, a limited understanding of Philosophy could lead to epistemic 
injustice whereby a Filipino child’s ideas are not seriously taken because ‘it is not 
philosophical enough.’ This usually happens when only western criteria are used to 
evaluate local ways of thinking. Whether or not this indigenized approach can be 
significant in western contexts is beyond the scope of this article. My suggestion, 
however, is that diversification of the content and methodology of P4wC avoids 
espousing a narrow understanding of Philosophy in P4wC, thereby expanding the 
interpretative resources concerning its nature and practice. Accordingly, it avoids a 
“gated” community of inquiry and resists privileging the dominant patterns and 
criteria for philosophical thinking, which means including as many epistemologies as 




In this article, one of my aims is to suggest that epistemic injustice, which 
usually begins from seemingly ‘trivial’ cases of identity prejudice, can potentially leak 
into the actual practice of P4wC. My five observations show that identity prejudice 
may arise at the various intersecting points of the different roles and positionalities of 
the participants in the COI. These intersections/locations pertain to the epistemic 
relationships between myself as a P4wC teacher, the students, and the foundations of 
P4wC. While these observations could mean that I was yet unsuccessful in applying 
the principles and fostering the values embedded in the program, they also highlight 
the fact that turning traditional classrooms into communities of inquiry necessarily 
involves a transformational process. Just like an athlete who needs to continually 
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practice in order to be better at a sport, building a COI, likewise, requires constant 
practice in establishing philosophical dialogues that address prejudice and, in the 
process, internalize more caring thinking without losing its critical import (SHARP, 
2014). It would be naïve of me to think that a class dramatically transforms into a COI 
in its first few philosophical dialogues. Some elements of the traditional classroom 
culture would continue to persist despite the appropriation of the principles and 
procedures of inquiry. Of course, the goal is to foster a community that has a keen 
sense of epistemic virtues, but while in the process, it is important to be sensitive to 
these intersections where identity prejudices would potentially surface. 
Based on these five observations, identity prejudice in P4wC either 
stems circumstantially and/or substantively. The first four observations mentioned 
above are rooted in the circumstantial factors that are distinct in a particular context, 
while the fifth observation is rooted substantively in the dominant understanding of 
the ‘P’ in P4wC.  
In the first four observations, identity prejudice arose from the circumstantial 
factors specific to the actual context of the philosophical dialogues. The circumstances 
surrounding them were all relevant to my P4wC practice but not essential to P4wC 
itself. They are all incidental factors, dependent on the particularities where I 
conducted my practice. For instance, the pejorative interpretations of the terms 
‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’ may not necessarily apply to other cultural contexts, 
thereby confining such observation only within my context. Is it necessary to pay 
attention to the circumstantial factors surrounding the COI? It may be well to recall that 
the framework for conceptualizing the nature of epistemic injustice focuses on the 
socially situated account of epistemic practices. Epistemic injustices, which are 
usually implicit within the social structures in the society, are made explicit when our 
epistemic practices are framed within the concrete social circumstances where power, 
privilege and authority intersect – which is observable in school settings. In this 
connection, a feasible way of spotting identity prejudices is to begin looking critically 
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at the particular and incidental elements that could potentially induce them. It is, 
therefore, essential to ask: What are the socio-cultural conditions underlying 
children’s position in the COI? What are the deeply ingrained negative stereotypes 
prevalent in the immediate community? Are there cases whereby students buy into 
the negative stereotypes? How does a P4wC teacher’s positionality affect the 
dialogues? What are the underlying views of the term ‘Philosophy’ from the 
immediate community or society? These are some of the questions that provide a 
socially situated description of the epistemic interactions within the COI, which are 
essential in exposing their ethical dimension. 
My fifth observation shows that identity prejudice may also arise from certain 
substantive factors that are directly connected to P4wC because these have something 
to do with its core theory. My assumption here is that there is an implicit 
hermeneutical lacuna or a gap in the interpretative resources in the dominant 
understanding of what Philosophy means in P4wC. My claim here is that the 
presuppositions in P4wC could be missing out from what other less dominant 
philosophies can contribute to its conceptual landscape. This is predicated on the 
premise that there are alternative epistemologies that are as equally legitimate as the 
standards of philosophical thinking currently leading P4wC scholarship and practice. 
One such epistemology can be inferred from the various forms of indigenous 
knowledge, which have a lot to contribute not only to P4wC but to a plethora of 
socio-economic, ecological, and cultural issues affecting the entire planet. Thus, as 
P4wC scholars and practitioners, we begin to rethink the ways we normally carry out 
philosophical dialogues, and perhaps welcome the possibility of integrating non-
dominant forms of knowledge in our fundamental assumptions.  
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